Using a sample of annual deposit data in the Netherlands for the 2004 -2014 period, we study the fraction of deposits transferred per year by 718 individuals. Controlling for demographic factors, we find that deposit rate differences across banks significantly explain the extent to which depositors reallocate their savings. This effect is predominantly present in non-crisis years, while depositors seemingly exhibited flight-to-safety behavior during the financial crisis. As this behavior holds for fully insured household deposits as well, we conclude that the effect of deposit insurance was muted during the past financial crisis.
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Introduction
Deposits are an important source of funding for banks, as they provide around three-fourth of total bank funding (Demsetz and Strahan, 1997; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2013) . The recent financial crisis showed that a bank's stability could be threatened by the risk of losing wholesale and retail deposits. Credit rating agencies pointed to these risks during the crisis.
For example, when the Icelandic bank Landsbanki increasingly relied on internet-based deposits for the financing of their operations, Moody's had concerns "related to the [lack of]
"stickiness" of overseas deposits" (Moody's, 2008) . In an attempt to shape a more resilient banking sector, the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision (BCBS) recognized different degrees of deposit solidity by labeling deposits "that can be withdrawn quickly (e.g., internet deposits)" (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2013: 28) as 'less stable'. In order to get a better understanding of the stability of deposits, it is crucial to understand the determinants of deposit switching behavior among retail clients. The current literature in this field predominantly studies a switch of an individual's main bank (i.e., the most frequently used bank). More specifically, Kiser (2002) and Brunetti et al. (2014) consider actual bank switching, while the propensity to switch banks or accounts is studied in Chakravarty et al. (2004) , Manrai and Manrai (2007) , and Van der Cruijsen and Diepstraaten (2015) . In these studies, switching is usually considered as a binary outcome variable: an individual either switches, or he keeps the original bank as main bank. In reality, individuals can have accounts at multiple banks. Hence, different banks or bank accounts can be used for different purposes.
Individuals might receive their salary and pay their mortgage at bank A, but might have a deposit account at bank B. 2 Moreover, individuals might have deposits at different types of banks. For example, a small deposit at bank C for funding daily expenditures, but a larger deposit at online savings bank D which pays a higher interest rate. Although online savings banks are not necessarily the individual's main bank, they may attract a sizeable amount of an individual's total deposits. The importance of these online banks is illustrated by Terris (2012) who showed that online banks' deposits grew at quadruple the industry pace. In this paper, we study to what extent the deposit rate determines a (partial) switch of deposits.
Eleven years of self-reported deposits data by retail depositors in the Netherlands enables us to consider partial switches, rather than just a 0/1 switching outcome. In addition, we shed light on switching behavior during the financial crisis. In the presence of a credible deposit 3 guarantee scheme (DGS), most individuals do not have incentives to switch deposits (i.e., to 'discipline' banks) as their deposits are insured. 3 Recent studies to market discipline (e.g., Beyhaghi et al. (2014) for Canada, and Berger and Turk-Ariss (2015) for the US and EU)
consider total deposits and uninsured deposits, and found that depositor discipline decreased during the past financial crisis. They attributed their results to an increased awareness of government actions (such as bailouts) at the beginning of the crisis. Given the focus on total deposits and uninsured deposits, these studies do not evaluate the efficacy of a DGS in times of crisis. Brown et al. (2013) Brown et al. (2013) by considering a different regional setting (i.e., the Netherlands), focusing on fractional switches over the [0, 1] domain, and comparing crisis behavior to non-crisis behavior.
We find that for depositors switching (parts of) their deposits, deposit rates play an important role in allocating their funds. More specifically, depending on the econometric specification, the average depositor switches a fraction of 0.023 to 0.076 of their total savings to banks which pay a 1 percentage point higher deposit rate. In addition, deposit rate increases vis-à-vis other banks are positively associated with the degree of switching as well. When we consider sub periods, we find that these relations are statistically significant pre-and postcrisis, but not during the crisis. This might indicate that depositors paid attention to other factors than deposit rates during the financial crisis, such as bank risk. An additional analysis revealed that bank switching was significantly higher in 2008 relative to other sample years, and that switching during that year occurred to banks which had not experienced a bailout or a nationalization. This is an indication that in a period during which major banks received government support, a DGS does not prevent retail clients from transferring their deposits.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our data and methodology, after which our estimation results are presented in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
Data and methodology
To identify bank switching, we make use of the DNB Household Survey (DHS We supplement DHS data with detailed daily interest rate data on demand deposits (i.e., savings accounts) provided by Spaarinformatie (see Bikker et al., 2016) . Spaarinformatie is an independent organization tracking deposit rates for all banks active in the Netherlands. Since banks in our sample offered up to five different demand deposits without constraints at the same time, for each bank, we averaged the offered rates to come to a single bank rate. For the category 'other banks', we first computed the average deposit rate per bank, after which we averaged those rates across all other banks active in the Netherlands.
The bank switching literature identified several relevant variables to include in our model.
This literature is broadly divided in papers studying the propensity to switch and its drivers (e.g., Chakravarty et al., 2004; Manrai and Manrai, 2007; Van der Cruijsen and Diepstraaten, 2015) and papers studying the determinants of past switching behavior (e.g., Kiser, 2002; and Brunetti et al., 2014) . Most papers discuss demographic factors when trying to explain bank switching, such as gender, age, marital status, education, income, and risk aversion. Consistent evidence was found for age, which is negatively related to switching behavior (Kiser, 2002; Brown et al., 2013; Van der Cruijsen and Diepstraaten, 2015) , and for the level of education, which is positively related to switching likelihood (Brunetti et al., 2015; Van der Cruijsen and 5 Diepstraaten, 2015) . 6 In addition, switching might be explained by bank relationships, such as the number of bank accounts in place prior to switching (Brunetti et al., 2014; Van der Cruijsen and Diepstraaten, 2015) .
In our model, we explain the increase of the proportion of total deposits on an individual's account by (i) the interest rate differential between the account to which the money is transferred and the account from which it has been withdrawn, and (ii) personal characteristics of the depositors. This leads to the following model:
Switchi,t measures for depositor i in year t in the case he or she changes the distribution of his or her deposits, the proportion of the deposits transferred to the account with the largest inflow.
Suppose depositor i holds 1000 euros on bank k and 1000 euros on bank l in year t-1, and increases in year t his holdings on bank k to 1800 euros and on bank l to 1200 euros. The proportions of savings for individual i in year t-1 were 0.5 and 0.5 for banks k and l, respectively.
In year t, the proportions changed to 0.6 and 0.4 for banks k and l, respectively. The dependent variable Switchi,t will then take on the value of 0.1. As a result of this methodology, Switchi,t ranges from larger than 0 up till and including 1. Note that values of 0 are excluded: if all deposit holding proportions of person i remain the same over two consecutive years, no switching has occurred.
We use two different variables for 'Rate'. First, , considers the difference in deposit rate between bank k, the bank facing in year t a relative increase in deposits from depositor i, and bank l, the bank confronted in that year with a relative decrease in deposits from that depositor.
As the transfer might have happened during year t, we compute the average of interest rates offered by both banks during that year. Second, we consider deposit rate changes occurring during the year of the two banks related with a switch. We deduct the rate change of bank l, the bank confronted in year t with a relative decrease in deposits from depositor i from that of bank k, the bank facing in that year a relative increase in deposits from that depositor, denoted by , . The rate change is defined as the average interest rate of year t minus the interest rate at the beginning of year t. Using this procedure, we detect whether bank k increased their interest 6 rates during the year relative to bank l.
Vector , contains control variables measured in year t. We use age (in years), gender (male=1, female=0), marital status (married=1, unmarried=0), higher education (1 if depositor completed higher education, 0 if not), risk aversion (scale variable from 1 -7 based on the question 'I think it is more important to have safe investments and guaranteed returns, than to take a risk to have a chance to get the highest possible returns'; 7 meaning highly risk averse, 1 meaning less risk averse), net income (in natural logarithms), multiple deposits (1 if the depositor already had multiple deposits at t-1, 0 if not), 7 and merger (1 if a depositor held a deposit at either Fortis Bank or Postbank, each during the last year of their existence). 0.157 percentage point during the switching year vis-à-vis the rate offered by the source bank.
The control variables reveal that two-third of our sample constitutes of males; the average age is 58 years; 70 percent is married; 52 percent finished a form of higher education; the depositors are relatively risk averse with an average score of 5.34 on a scale of 1 to 7; their annual net income equals almost 30 thousand euros; 85 percent already owned multiple deposits prior to switching; and 8.8 percent of our observations concerned individuals with an account at a bank which merged into another bank in that year.
Columns (8) to (10) of Table 1 show the outcome of a univariate test. We test here whether the average values for our explanatory variables differ when the fraction switched is relatively large, that is, larger than the median switching fraction 0.185 (e.g, Column 8) versus relatively small, that is, smaller than its median value (e.g., Column 9). Column 10 shows the difference and indicates statistical significance levels, and Column 11 reveals the t-value of the difference.
We found that the switching proportion was significantly positively related to both Rate a and Multivariate results are discussed in the next section. As Switchi,t is a variable in the range [0, 1], we use fractional response models with a probit model for the conditional mean for our regressions (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996) . 9 We test all econometric specifications for multicollinearity by using the variance-inflation factor (VIF). The year-dummies exhibit VIF values of up to 2.89, while the variance-inflation factors of other variables never exceeded 5.74 (i.e., for Age). These values are well below the cut-off level of 10 (Belsley et al., 1980; Studenmund, 1992) . We therefore conclude that multi-collinearity was not an issue of concern in this study. namely multiple deposits and bank merger, which are both highly significant. Multiple deposits has a marginal effect of -0.357, indicating that depositors which already held multiple deposits have, on average, switches which are a fraction of 0.357 of their total savings lower. For these depositors, savings were already spread over at least two accounts, and it was therefore to be expected that new switches would involve a relatively lower fraction of total deposits. In addition, this model considers the effect of a bank merger. The fraction of total deposits switched is 0.231 higher when individuals held deposits at a bank which merges into another entity. In this specification, the coefficient of Rate a decreased to 0.024, statistically significant at the 5%-level.
Multivariate results
Model 3 incorporates all control variables, including those reflecting personal characteristicsboth psychological and financial. Rate a remains significant at the 5%-level, while its coefficient drops slightly to 0.023. In addition, the model reveals that depositors switch larger fractions when they are married, but smaller fractions if they are higher educated or have a higher income.
We consider 
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To shed more light on this issue, we divided our sample in crisis years versus non-crisis years. Table 3 shows regression results for crisis years (switching behavior during 2008 and 2009) and non-crisis years (2005 -2007 and 2010 -2014) . 13 For expository reasons, we do not report the coefficients of control variables and time-dummies. During non-crisis periods, the effects of Rate a and Rate b are both economically and statistically significant at a higher level than in our full sample estimations as reported in Table 2 . However, during the financial crisis, deposit rates lost their explanatory power, indicating that depositors started paying less attention to rates during the crisis when switching deposits.
Inspection of detailed supervisory data on total household savings balances in the Netherlands, shows for our main banks that total household deposits fell at the bailed out or 
Conclusion
We studied deposit switching in the Netherlands during the years 2005 -2014. Contrary to existing literature which focuses on an individual's switch of their most frequently used bank or account, we considered the transfer of fractions of deposits between accounts by individuals. We matched the degree of switching with the deposit rate differential between banks. After controlling for demographic factors, we found that the level of switching is positively associated with (i) the difference in deposit rates between the banks involved with the switch, and (ii) the differences in the change in the deposit rate over time between the involved banks. While the fraction of deposits switched increased during the financial crisis, deposit rates were unrelated to bank switching during that period. We attribute switching behavior during the financial crisis to a flight-to-safety among depositors and consider this as evidence that the efficacy of a deposit guarantee system is muted once a country's largest banks experience several shocks. 
